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Abstract—In order to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, several
countries enforced extended social distancing measures for sev-
eral weeks, effectively pausing the majority of economic activities.
In an effort to resume economic activity safely, several Digital
Contact Tracing applications and protocols have been introduced
with success. However, DCT is a reactive method, as it aims to
break existing chains of disease transmission in a population.
Therefore DCT is not suitable for proactively preventing the
spread of a disease; an approach that relevant to certain use
cases, such as international tourism, where individuals travel
across borders. In this work, we first identify the limitations
characterising DCT related to privacy issues, unwillingness of
the public to use DCT mobile apps due to privacy concerns,
lack of interoperability among different DCT applications and
protocols, and the assumption that there is limited, local mobility
in the population. We then discuss the concept of a Health
Passport as a means of verifying that individuals are disease
risk-free and how it could be used to resume the international
tourism sector. Following, we present the DHP Framework that
uses a private blockchain and Proof of Authority for issuing
Digital Health Passports. The framework provides a distributed
infrastructure supporting the issuance of DHPs by foreign health
systems and their verification by relevant stakeholders, such as
airline companies and border control authorities. We discuss the
attributes of the system in terms of its usability and performance,
security and privacy. Finally, we conclude by identifying future
extensions of our work on formal security and privacy properties
that need to be rigorously guaranteed via appropriate security
protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
The world has always been experiencing endemic and
pandemic outbreaks and their potential impact as global threats
is well established. However, in recent years the frequency
and likelihood of such outbreaks as well as their collateral
economic damage is continuously growing [1]. Related re-
search indicates that this is due to several factors favouring
the spread of zoonotic diseases, such as the ever increasing
urbanization and deforestation, the ongoing climate crisis and
the increasingly globalized and connected world economy [2].
Already, in the first two decades of the 21th century there have
been several global outbreaks, including those caused by the
SARS-CoV (2003), H1N1 (2009), MERS-CoV (2012), Ebola
(2014), Zika (2015) and SARS-CoV-2 (2020) viruses.
Particularly in the case of SARS-CoV-2, the implications
of the associated disease, COVID-19, have been globally
profound. Initially reported in Wuhan, People’s Republic of
China in December 2019, the virus has practically spread to
all countries in the world in the following months. By May
2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) reported nearly
four million COVID-19 cases and more than two hundred
sixty thousand related deaths worldwide [3]. The spread was
rapid and caused, in a short period of time, a significantly
increased number of patients requiring admission to hospitals
and intensive care units, resulting to some health systems to
be overwhelmed [4].
The response by governments in trying to initially reduce
the infection rate and eventually contain the pandemic was to
adopt extended social distancing measures and in several cases
to impose total lockdowns. The measures were in place for a
typical period of three months before starting to be partially
lifted subject to the rate of infection being adequately low [5].
As a result, the economic activity in almost all sectors
paused, except for key activities related to health and safety
services, and distribution of food and essential goods. The
economic repercussions were severe; indicatively, the World
Bank predicted in a preliminary report in April 2020 a 4%
contraction of the global GDP under an amplified global
pandemic [6]; the World Trade Organisation expected global
trade to fall up to 32% in 2020 [7]; reports estimated the
drop in the USA GDP to be as high as 11% [8]; and the
European Commission expected a record 7% contraction of
the EU economy [9]. For countries whose economies have
great exposure on international tourism, such as Mexico, Spain
and Greece, contraction would be even greater, reaching or
exceeding 15% [7]. A positive linear correlation was found be-
tween the duration of the measures and the negative impact on
economy. Therefore, the need to fine tune the balance between
reducing the negative economic impact and containing the
pandemic necessitated for innovative and effective lockdown
exit strategies.
In laying down such exit strategies, the WHO recommen-
dations on monitoring and controlling a pandemic need to
be considered: rapid diagnosis and immediate isolation of
cases; rigorous tracking; and precautionary self-isolation of
recent social contacts [10]. In the case of SARS-CoV-2 lack
of accurate rapid tests (since SARS-CoV-2 was new) means
that the testing capacity and throughput of health systems was
limited. Therefore much focus was placed on rigorous contact
tracing of newly identified COVID-19 patients. This approach
aimed to increase the effectiveness of diagnostic testing by
promptly identifying asymptomatic patients and pre-emptively
removing them from the general population via self-isolation.
Empirically, it was proven that countries that adopted this
strategy were successful in containing the pandemic in its early
stages [11].
However, the testing-tracing-isolating strategy remains a
reactive strategy. It only allows for a ”trial-and-monitor”
approach in which social distancing measures are tightened
and loosened in an iterative manner while monitoring the
infection rate of a population. This strategy does not allow
for a safe and total restart of the local and global economy.
For instance, it does not allow for the informed reopening
of hospitality businesses (restaurants, entertainment venues,
etc) or the full return to work of office employees. At a
global scale, reactive strategies do not allow for international
travels to resume and therefore economies that have significant
exposure to international tourism remain extremely vulnerable.
In this context, some governments have suggested that the
detection of antibodies to the SARS-CoV-2 could serve as
the basis for an ”immunity passport” or risk-free certificate
that would enable individuals to travel or to return to work
assuming that they are protected against re-infection. However,
by the time of writing, there is no evidence that people
who have recovered from COVID-19 and have antibodies are
protected from a second infection [12].
Our contribution. There is a need for a framework that will
allow for continuous, scalable, reliable, secure, trustworthy
and timely sharing of information across different health
systems and countries on whether individuals are infected with
SARS-CoV-2. Our contribution is summarised as follows:
• We analyse Digital Contact Tracing as a method of mon-
itoring and preventing the spread of a contagious disease
such as COVID-19. We identify (a) its dependency upon
public perception and adoption (mainly due to privacy
concerns); (b) its reactive nature, as it assumes that the
disease is already present in the population; and (c) the
problem of interoperability among different DCT appli-
cations and protocols. These limitations make DCT not
fit for purpose in use cases, such as international tourism,
where individuals need to travel over long distances and
across borders.
• Motivated by the dependency of several national
economies (such as those of Mexico, Portugal, and
Greece) on international tourism, and the relevant an-
nouncements by the World Health Organisation and sev-
eral national governments, we discuss the concept of
a Digital Health Passport. We outline a corresponding
use case and define the relevant functional and technical
requirements.
• We present DHP Framework; a scalable, distributed and
secure framework for issuing Digital Health Passports
(DHP). The framework provisions the secure issuance
of digitally signed DHPs by local health facilities to
individuals following medical tests. Each health facility
announces the DHPs to its corresponding national health
authority, that proceeds with registering them on a private
blockchain. The health authorities of multiple countries
form part of the DHP Blockchain consortium, which
uses Proof of Authority as a consensus mechanism. The
consortium also includes members with read-only access
on the blockchain, such as airline companies and border
control authorities. These members are able to check the
validity of the health passport only for the travellers they
are concerned and in a way that respects their privacy
and their right to be forgotten.
• We analyse the presented framework with respect to its
functionality, as well as its security and privacy aspects.
We conclude the paper, by identifying future extensions
of our work on formal security and privacy properties that
need to be rigorously guaranteed via appropriate security
protocols.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we provide
the background and cover the related work on strategies for
controlling epidemics, we discuss Digital Contact Tracing and
provide its limitations, and we provide a brief introduction to
blockchain technologies and key relevant concepts. In Section
III, we discuss the concept of Digital Health Passports and
their application in international tourism during an ongoing
global pandemic. In Section IV we present in detail the DHP
Blockchain framework; the involved actors, data structures
and procedures. In Section V, we discuss the attributes of the
system in terms of its usability and performance, security and
privacy. Finally, in Section VI, we conclude by identifying
future extensions of our work on formal security and privacy
properties that need to be rigorously guaranteed via appropri-
ate security protocols.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Epidemic control strategies and their impact
The modern globalized world economy heavily relies on
international travels and global trade. As a result, widespread
outbreaks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic caused by the
SARS-CoV-2 virus, are very hard to contain in a single country
or region mainly due to the increased connectedness of modern
societies. In this context, WHO has identified the best strategy
for monitoring and controlling a pandemic in a combination
of large-scale testing, rigorous contact tracing, isolation and
quarantine, in parallel with moderate (e.g., South Korea) or
strong (e.g., China) social-distancing measures [10], [13]. The
strategy aims at first flattening the infection curve; i.e. in
reducing the rate at which new patients contract the virus, such
that local health systems are given enough time to upscale their
capacity and not be overwhelmed [14].
In principle, the strategy works by breaking the chain of
transmission and by promptly identifying clusters of infection
in the population, which subsequently are isolated from the
rest of the population [15], [16]. In practice, however, how the
strategy is implemented depends on several externalities, such
as: how quickly and how strictly the measures will be applied
by local authorities [17]; how much the local population will
adhere to the measures [18]–[20] and what is the level of trust
to authorities [21], [22]; and the characteristics of the virus
(incubation period, mode of transmission, etc.) [23], [24].
In the case of SARS-CoV-2, social distancing measures
(whether strict or moderate) were maintained for an average
period of three months prior to being relaxed [5]. Within this
period, the grand majority of the economic activities were
halted at national and regional levels, while there were severe
disruptions at a global level. The World Bank predicted in
a preliminary report in April 2020 a 4% contraction of the
global GDP under an amplified global pandemic [6]; reports
estimated the drop in the USA GDP to be as high as 11%
[8]; and the European Commission expected a record 7%
contraction of the EU economy [25].
B. Digital Contact Tracing and its limitations
In the context of the testing-tracing-isolating strategy, sev-
eral countries employed the use of digital technology in
order to perform rigorous contact tracing of newly identified
COVID-19 patients. In [26] authors showed that Digital Con-
tact Tracing (DCT) - i.e., the use of smartphones to trace
and notify recent contacts of a newly identified patient - and
immediate notification are sufficient to stop the epidemic if the
corresponding mobile applications are used by a sufficiently
high proportion of the population. Due to the use of personal
devices, DCT applications pose several issues with regards to
the personal privacy of their users [27], [28] and as a result
public concerns were raised.
Several DCT protocols and applications have been de-
veloped to address the privacy issues, such as PACT [29],
CONTAIN [30], TraceSecure [31] and the NHS COVID-19
app [32] in the UK. Passive DCT methods include the use
of GPS data and Bluetooth beacons while participatory ones
include scanning of QR codes by the user [33]. DCT methods
are also distinguished in centralised and decentralised ones
[33], while there have been efforts for hybrid approaches [34].
Despite the privacy considerations, DCT methods, have been
proven effective in helping break new transmission chains in
a population.
However, we identify significant limitations.
• Firstly, DCT is dependant upon the perception of and
its adoption by the general public. As public awareness
on privacy issues - particularly in the context of digital
systems - is growing globally, citizens are cautious and
perhaps reluctant to use or voluntarily disclose data on
their activities. This does not make the method reliable
for monitoring and controlling pandemics in the general
case.
• Secondly, DCT methods are reactive in nature. While
they help identify and break new transmission chains of
infection, they do not provide a means for protecting
against their initiation. On the contrary, the method helps
identify potential future cases given that the disease is
already present in the population.
• Thirdly, in the general case, different DCT applications
are not interoperable with each other. Apart from not
allowing for seamless exchange of data, lack of in-
teroperability also makes DCT unsuitable as a method
for international travels as a single DCT application is
expected to be deployed in a specific country and as such
assumes a moderate to low mobility of the population.
C. Blockchain: a brief introduction
Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology where data
(commonly refered to as transactions) are registered in blocks
that are linked to each other using cryptography, thus forming
a chain [35]. New transactions are registered in new blocks
that are created and appended to the chain by special actors
in the network; these are referred to as miners, validators
or authorities depending on the design of the network. Con-
sensus mechanisms are used in order for the members of
the consortium to validate and agree on the current state
of the blockchain. Indicative consensus mechanisms include
Proof of Work - where the validation of a new block re-
quires solving computationally hard puzzles; Proof of Stake
- where the validation requires the monetary commitment of
the validator; and Proof of Authority - where the validators
are considered trust-worthy, honest and their identity is well-
known. Blockchain consortia can also be distinguished to
public, private and permissioned with respect to access rights.
Public blockchains are open access and any member of the
network can join and participate in the core activities of
the network. Private blockchains allow only selected entry
of verified participants, while permissioned blockchains allow
a mixed approach where members can join after suitable
verification and can be assigned roles with different rights in
the network.
III. DIGITAL HEALTH PASSPORTS FOR PROACTIVE
PANDEMIC CONTAINMENT
A. Motivation: International tourism and the case of Greece
Among the most severely affected economic sectors by the
COVID-19 pandemic have been global trade and international
tourism. The World Trade Organisation expected global trade
to fall up to 32% in 2020 due to te COVID-19 pandemic [7].
The effects of COVID-19 in the tourism, hospitality and recre-
ation sectors have been unprecedented. In the accommodation
and lodging sectors, quarterly revenues went down 75%, while
travel agents saw a slowdown in bookings of 50% in March
of 2020 [6]. As of mid-March 2020, international travel was
ground to a halt, with the World Travel and Tourism Council
(WTTC) estimating that global travel would decline at least
25% in 2020 anticipating a loss of up to USD2.1 trillions
in 2020. The International Air Transport Association (IATA)
projected a resulting revenue loss for airlines of USD252
billion [36].
These developments represented a major risk to countries
whose economies have significant exposure to international
tourism. For instance, in Greece the impact of the crisis was
forecast to be large due to the importance of the hospitality
sector in economy (the sector represents more than 20% of
the national GDP) and the high share of micro enterprises,
which are vulnerable [9]. The pandemic came at a time when
the Greek economy was recovering after ten years of austerity
measures following the financial crisis of 2008.
After having imposed strict social distancing and self-
isolation measures promptly, Greece was successful in manag-
ing the pandemic. As a result, in May 2020, Greek authorities
partially lifted the measures with the aim of opening the
country for the upcoming summer tourist season. Nevertheless,
how to effectively safeguard local population from subsequent
pandemic waves while at the same time welcoming and
catering for international tourists remained an open question.
In an effort to address the issue, the concept of some sort of
”immunity passport” or risk-free certificate has been consid-
ered [12]. The idea, as announced by the Greek Governement,
was for international travellers to be tested for COVID-19 at
least 72 hours prior to their departure and to be allowed to
enter the country subject to them having tested negative to
the virus [37]. Contrary to the reactive strategy of testing-
tracing-isolating, this was a proactive strategy that sought to
obstruct infected (and potentially asymptomatic) individuals
from entering the country. However, the announced approach
posed several issues. In particular:
• Firstly, it required international tourists to take the di-
agnostic test several days before their flight, thus not
addressing the possibility of contracting the virus in the
following days.
• Secondly, the details on who the certifying authority
would be (e.g. local private clinic or a certified health
unit) were not specified. A standardised approach is
needed that will be able to address discrepancies among
different health systems, diagnostic methods, as well as
for attribution purposes (e.g. in the case of fraudulent
documents issued illegally).
• Thirdly, the form of the certificate was not specified. If
the certificate is in the form of a printed document, then
it is susceptible to forgery. A digital form would provide
guarantees in this respect, but this approach raises the
following point.
• In the case of a digital certificate, the challenge of how
will information be shared seamlessly and timely among
different stakeholders (e.g. airlines, border authorities,
etc) across different countries while respecting the privacy
of the travellers needs to be addressed.
B. The use case on international tourism
We consider the case of international tourism, where people
travel by airplane across different countries. During a pan-
demic, such as that of COVID-19, we assume that hygiene
protocols are enforced by countries that specify a series of
entry conditions for international travellers (similar to those
for travel visas). In this study, motivated by the announcements
of the Greek government in May 2020 [37], we assume that
the hygiene protocols require the travellers to take a diagnostic
test at a given time prior to the date of travel and that the test
needs to be conducted using a specific method. The latter is
motivated by the fact that the RT-qPCR method (the main
diagnostic method for COVID-19 by May 2020) can only
achieve a sensitivity between 50% and 79% [38] and therefore,
at the time of writing, additional methods are being researched.
IV. THE DIGITAL HEALTH PASSPORTS FRAMEWORK
A. Actors and data structures in the DHP Framework.
We identify the following actors and data structures:
Testing Health Facilities (THF) are local health care
facilities - such as hospitals, clinics, and medical laboratories
- where individuals can get tested on whether they are active
carriers of the virus (i.e. if they can transmit the virus). THFs
are the entities responsible for verifying the identity of the
individuals and the validity of the test results. THFs would
participate in a public key infrastructure (PKI) scheme to
produce and sign the digital passports. In essence, the health
certificate can be expressed as a conventional X.509 type
of digital passport with an appropriate scheme capturing the
information that is appropriate in this problem domain. The
use of a digital passport will enable the party that is responsible
for publishing the results on the blockchain to authenticate
the information produced and sent by the THF. The digital
passport scheme will however need to contain information
in the form to support the security and privacy properties as
described later on.
The technical details of the test, such as the time it takes to
produce the results, its accuracy and precision, its type, etc.,
are considered external parameters specified by corresponding
medical experts and are out of the scope of the presented sys-
tem. We note, that regarding SARS-CoV-2 and the associated
disease, COVID-19, at the time of writing there is no scientific
evidence that people who have recovered from COVID-19 and
have antibodies are protected from a second infection [12].
Therefore, we consider that the results of a test are valid for
a specified period of time beyond which the person needs to
be tested again. We also anticipate that over time new testing
methods will be developed and therefore the type of test used
is a parameter that needs to be captured.
We define the Digital Health Passport (DHP) for individ-
ual i at time j as
ci,j = 〈pi; rj ; tj ;σ; sTHF 〉 (1)
where pi is the output of a privacy preserving cryptographic
primitive1; ri is the boolean result of the test (i.e., the
individual is risk free or not); ti is a timestamp specifying
the date of the result; σ denotes the testing method used;
and sTHF denotes the digital signature of the THF for this
certificate.
The DHP Blockchain is a private blockchain where DHPs
are registered. As a private blockchain it does not allow public
access to the data it contains and the identity of all partici-
pating entities is verified and well-known. The participating
entities are of two types (defined in the next paragraphs); (a)
1We elaborate on the role of this field in Section VI-B
Fig. 1. Reference architecture of the DHP Framework.
the Health Service Authorities that have full access rights on
the blockchain; and (b) the Blockchain Members that have
only read rights on the blockchain. In the DHP Blockchain
the Health Service Authorities use Proof of Authority as a
consensus mechanism [39].
The Health Service Authority (HSA) is the local authority,
operating at a national level (e.g. the NHS in the UK), that
collects from the THFs in its constituency the issued DHPs
and registers them on the DHP Blockchain. This is considered
a trustworthy and honest entity that maintains and grows the
DHP Blockchain in collaboration with its peer HSAs from
other countries. In blockchain terms, HSAs batch multiple
DHPs together and generate the corresponding new blocks
that are appended to the DHP Blockchain. HSAs are the only
entities that have the right to generate and append new blocks.
The DHP Blockchain Member (BM) is an entity that is
member of the DHP Blockchain consortium but only has read
access rights. This allows the BM to check if a person is the
holder of a valid DHP. Such entities include airline companies,
airport security, border control authorities, and other relevant
stakeholders.
B. Procedure Description
In order for an individual to make an international travel,
they will need to be the holders of a valid travel document
as well as of a valid Digital Health Passport. It is also
assumed that they have an adequately secure smartphone
device to participate in the verification. Unlike the digital
contact tracing apps that introduce risks to the individual’s
privacy, the proposed app is used to enforce the privacy of the
individual’s result. In the case of the app being compromised
(assuming that the privacy preserving protocol computations
fail), the user will suffer a Denial of Service with respect to
using the DHP Framework. Mitigations of this type of risks
are outside the scope of this paper. Moreover, it should be
noted that the proposed approach can also work without the
use of a smartphone and app, but it should be noted that
in this case the problem is reduced to a plain verification
of an individual’s examination results without the privacy
preservation aspects. In this case, pi would be reduced to a
straightforward cryptographic one-way hash function.
The process is structured in two phases - the DHP issuance
and the DHP verification, as follows.
Phase 0: Citizen registration
Step 1: The individual downloads and registers on the
DHP app. The registration involves the generation of a
type of digital wallet where the citizen’s travel document
- along with the accompanying parameters set out by
the underlying encryption scheme - is encrypted by their
public key. This ensures that the citizen can prove that
they are the individuals referenced by the respective travel
document.
Phase 1: Digital Health Passport issuance
Step 1: The individual arrives at their local THF and
declares that they would like to be issued a DHP for
international travel. They present their travel document
(out-of-band) and get tested for the virus.
Step 2: When the results are ready, the traveller is in-
formed of the outcome. If the results indicate that they
are risk free, they request from the THF to issue a DHP;
by doing so, they also provide their consent for the THF
and the corresponding HSA to register the DHP on the
DHP Blockchain.
Step 3: The THF issues the DHP corresponding to the
results of that particular test using the travel document
to generate the DHP parameters. The THF then transmits
the DHP to the corresponding HSA.
Step 4: The HSA collects the DHPs issued by the THFs
in its constituency and proceeds with generating the
corresponding blocks and appending them to the DHP
Blockchain.
Step 5: The HSA informs the THFs of the block headers
for each registered DHP they issued. In turn, the THF
provides the individual with a DHP token containing the
block header corresponding to their new DHP.
Phase 2: Digital Health Passport verification
Step 1: The individual proceeds with purchasing their air
flight ticket. During their check-in, they provide the
airline company with their travel document, their DHP
token and they give consent through the DHP app for the
airline company to access their examination results record
instance. The latter triggers a process that sends the
required data to perform searchable encryption operations
on the DHP Blockchain.
Step 2: The airline (a BM with read-only rights on the
DHP Blockchain) uses the DHP token to identify and
retrieve the DHP in the corresponding block. The airline
performs searchable encryption (or a hash lookup in the
case of the citizen opting out of the app) of the travel
document and identifies the corresponding health passport
in the retrieved block.
Step 3: The airline verifies the integrity of the DHP using
its digital signature. It then proceeds with verifying the
validity of the DHP; i.e. if the test result, timestamp and
test type adhere to the the hygiene protocol enforced by
the destination authorities.
Step 4: If the certificate adheres to the hygiene protocol in
force at the destination, the boarding pass is issued and
the individual proceeds with their travel.
V. DHP FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS
A. Usability and efficiency
The use case we consider on international tourism involves
the two heavily regulated sectors of health and airline in-
dustry. This facilitates the implementation of the presented
DHP Framework, since the identity of all involved actors
will be easily validated, therefore, contributing to their ac-
countability. Furthermore, both sectors are experienced with
protocols and processes of identity validation, and storage and
management of personal data. This contributes to the positive
public perception and acceptance of the system, particularly
when compared to the concerns raised with regards to DCT
applications (consider the act of visiting a medical facility
versus installing a mobile application that explicitly collects
location or social interaction data). The framework makes use
of the Proof of Authority consensus mechanism, which allows
for a short transaction time (i.e. the amount of time needed
for new data to be registered on the blockchain) with low
demands on computing power, therefore making the operation
of the framework cost effective.
The DHP Framework makes use of a distributed ledger
where the validators of new blocks are the national health
authorities of each country. This allows for countries to
participate in the digital health passport scheme in a controlled
and scalable way, while at the same time obfuscating any
heterogeneities. For instance, national health systems may use
different diagnostic methods, may have different underlying
structures, or may enforce different hygiene protocols that
airline companies and border control authorities need to follow
for allowing incoming international travellers. The presented
DHP Framework provisions the registration of all needed data
that is needed by the stakeholders for this purpose and also
provides a tools for seamless, continuous, secure and timely
exchange of such data.
B. Security considerations
Following, we elaborate on the security aspects of the DHP
Framework.
1) Integrity: Each DHP is digitally signed by the issuing
THF using asymmetric encryption, and therefore its integrity
is guaranteed. Furthermore, each DHP is linked to a specific
person via the corresponding travel document and therefore is
not transferable to another person.
2) Attribution and accountability: The issuing THF of each
DHP can be identified by its digital signature. Therefore, each
individual THF is accountable for issuing true and correct
DHPs and can be back-tracked if needed (e.g. in the case
of a THF issuing fraudulent DHPs).
3) Immutability: The DHP Framework provides guarantees
on the immutability of the record of the registered DHPs, as
derived from the use of blockchain. This is in contrast to a
physical health passport (e.g. in the form of a document) that
can be subject to forgery.
C. Privacy considerations
Following we elaborate on the privacy aspects of the DHP
Framework.
1) Anonymity: The liaison between a DHP and an individ-
ual is the corresponding travel document which is stored using
a privacy preserving cryptographic primitive. Therefore, one
can not retrieve the details of the DHP holder, unless they are
provided with the details of the travel document.
2) Right to be forgotten: The individual explicitly consents
to the DHP being registered on the DHP Blockchain when
initiating the process at the THF. Then the individual proceeds
with providing the airline company with their travel document
during chekc-in. Therefore, the airline company can now
parse the distributed ledger in order to retrieve additional
entries corresponding to the same individual. Although this
does not apply globally, in several regions there is legislation
in place that safeguards the citizens’ right to be forgotten
(e.g. the General Data Protection Regulation in the European
Union) and the individual can request that all records including
personal data are deleted.
VI. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
In this section we identify formal security and privacy
properties that need to be guaranteed rigorously in future
research. Developing corresponding security protocols is the
subject of future research.
A. Security properties
Considering that the DHP Framework is based on the
deployment of a distributed ledger, we argue that the following
properties need to be met:
1) θ-Liveness: All reporting HSAs will report honestly
submitted items within some delay bound θ [40].
2) Consistency: At any given point in time, all verifying
parties should obtain the same outcome. As a traveller may
be tested more than once, there should be no potentially
conflicting outcomes. This property, combined with θ-liveness
ensures that the information on the examination result will be
valid and timely.
3) Verifiability: It should be possible for a BM to associate
a time bounded examination result with a given traveller
(currently achieved in the DHP Framework using the DHP
timestamp).
4) Attribution: It should be possible to identify the THF
of a particular test result. This is necessary, as the party
performing the test can be different from the party reporting
and publishing the result (currently achieved in the DHP
Framework by the digital signature of each THF).
5) Unforgeability: A DHP should be unforgeable. This
can be achieved with the use of a public key infrastructure
(currently addressed in the DHP Framework by the digital
signature of each THF).
6) Accountable verifiability: It should be possible for a BM
to demonstrate that they performed a verification process for
all travellers included in a given manifest. We conjecture that
this property can be offered through the deployment of smart
contracts.
B. Privacy properties
1) Unlinkability: It should not be possible for a BM to as-
sociate all past exams recorded on the ledger with a particular
traveller; The BM should have restricted and local scope that
is bounded by the time applicable to a particular travel event.
2) Unexplorability: It should not be possible for a curious
verifier to traverse the blockchain and obtain examination
information from individuals who are not in the manifest of a
particular travel event.
3) Anonymity: All data pertaining to a citizen’s health ex-
amination results should not be readily linked to an individual.
REFERENCES
[1] “Outbreak readiness and business impact - protecting lives and
livelihoods across the global economy,” World Economic Forum,
Tech. Rep., 2019. [Online]. Available: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEFHGHI Outbreak Readiness Business Impact.pdf
[2] C. A. Gordon, D. P. McManus, M. K. Jones, D. J. Gray, and G. N.
Gobert, “The increase of exotic zoonotic helminth infections: The impact
of urbanization, climate change and globalization,” in Advances in
parasitology. Elsevier, 2016, vol. 91, pp. 311–397.
[3] “Coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19): situation report, 110,” World
Health Organization, 2020.
[4] E. J. Emanuel, G. Persad, R. Upshur, B. Thome, M. Parker, A. Glickman,
C. Zhang, C. Boyle, M. Smith, and J. P. Phillips, “Fair allocation of
scarce medical resources in the time of covid-19,” New England Journal
of Medicine, Mar. 2020.
[5] F. E. Alvarez, D. Argente, and F. Lippi, “A simple planning problem
for covid-19 lockdown,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Tech.
Rep., 2020.
[6] V. D. M. D. Maliszewska Maryla, Mattoo Aaditya, “The potential impact
of covid-19 on gdp and trade : A preliminary assessment,” The World
Bank, resreport, Apr. 2020.
[7] N. Fernandes, “Economic effects of coronavirus outbreak (covid-19) on
the world economy,” Available at SSRN 3557504, 2020.
[8] S. R. Baker, N. Bloom, S. J. Davis, and S. J. Terry, “Covid-induced
economic uncertainty,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working
Paper 26983, April 2020.
[9] “European economic forecast - spring 2020. european commission,
directorate-general for economic and financial affairs,” May
2020. [Online]. Available: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/
economy-finance/ip125 en.pdf
[10] “Critical preparedness, readiness and response actions for covid-19,”
World Health Organization, Tech. Rep., 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://apps.who.int/iris/rest/bitstreams/1272587/retrieve
[11] M. Salath, C. L. Althaus, R. Neher, S. Stringhini, E. Hodcroft, J. Fellay,
M. Zwahlen, G. Senti, M. Battegay, A. Wilder-Smith, I. Eckerle,
M. Egger, and N. Low, “COVID-19 epidemic in switzerland: on the
importance of testing, contact tracing and isolation,” Swiss Medical
Weekly, Mar. 2020.
[12] “Immunity passports in the context of covid-19,” Apr. 2020.
[Online]. Available: https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/
detail/immunity-passports-in-the-context-of-covid-19
[13] M. Gilbert, M. Dewatripont, E. Muraille, J.-P. Platteau, and M. Goldman,
“Preparing for a responsible lockdown exit strategy,” Nature Medicine,
Apr. 2020.
[14] R. M. Anderson, H. Heesterbeek, D. Klinkenberg, and T. D.
Hollingsworth, “How will country-based mitigation measures influence
the course of the COVID-19 epidemic?” The Lancet, vol. 395, no. 10228,
pp. 931–934, Mar. 2020.
[15] M. W. Fong, H. Gao, J. Y. Wong, J. Xiao, E. Y. Shiu, S. Ryu, and B. J.
Cowling, “Nonpharmaceutical measures for pandemic influenza in non-
healthcare settings—social distancing measures,” Emerging Infectious
Diseases, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 976–984, May 2020.
[16] S. M. Kissler, C. Tedijanto, M. Lipsitch, and Y. Grad, “Social distancing
strategies for curbing the COVID-19 epidemic,” Mar. 2020.
[17] F. Ganem, F. M. Mendes, S. B. Oliveira, V. B. G. Porto, W. Araujo,
H. Nakaya, F. A. Diaz-Quijano, and J. Croda, “The impact of early
social distancing at COVID-19 outbreak in the largest metropolitan area
of brazil.” Apr. 2020.
[18] M. Painter and T. Qiu, “Political beliefs affect compliance with COVID-
19 social distancing orders,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020.
[19] H. Allcott, L. Boxell, J. Conway, M. Gentzkow, M. Thaler, and D. Yang,
“Polarization and public health: Partisan differences in social distancing
during the coronavirus pandemic,” Tech. Rep., Apr. 2020.
[20] C. Makridis and C. Wu, “Ties that bind (and social distance): How
social capital helps communities weather the COVID-19 pandemic,”
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020.
[21] R. A. Blair, B. S. Morse, and L. L. Tsai, “Public health and public
trust: Survey evidence from the ebola virus disease epidemic in liberia,”
Social Science & Medicine, vol. 172, pp. 89–97, jan 2017.
[22] J. Trapido, “Ebola: public trust, intermediaries, and rumour in the DR
congo,” The Lancet Infectious Diseases, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 457–458,
may 2019.
[23] Q. Li, X. Guan, P. Wu, X. Wang, L. Zhou, Y. Tong, R. Ren, K. S. Leung,
E. H. Lau, J. Y. Wong, X. Xing, N. Xiang, Y. Wu, C. Li, Q. Chen, D. Li,
T. Liu, J. Zhao, M. Liu, W. Tu, C. Chen, L. Jin, R. Yang, Q. Wang,
S. Zhou, R. Wang, H. Liu, Y. Luo, Y. Liu, G. Shao, H. Li, Z. Tao,
Y. Yang, Z. Deng, B. Liu, Z. Ma, Y. Zhang, G. Shi, T. T. Lam, J. T. Wu,
G. F. Gao, B. J. Cowling, B. Yang, G. M. Leung, and Z. Feng, “Early
transmission dynamics in wuhan, china, of novel coronavirus–infected
pneumonia,” New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 382, no. 13, pp.
1199–1207, Mar. 2020.
[24] M. Lipsitch, “Transmission dynamics and control of severe acute res-
piratory syndrome,” Science, vol. 300, no. 5627, pp. 1966–1970, Jun.
2003.
[25] P. Release, “Spring 2020 economic forecast: A deep and uneven reces-
sion, an uncertain recovery,” European Commission, Tech. Rep., May
2020.
[26] L. Ferretti, C. Wymant, M. Kendall, L. Zhao, A. Nurtay, L. Abeler-
Drner, M. Parker, D. Bonsall, and C. Fraser, “Quantifying SARS-CoV-
2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing,”
Science, vol. 368, no. 6491, p. eabb6936, mar 2020.
[27] Q. Tang, “Privacy-preserving contact tracing: current solutions and open
questions.”
[28] H. Cho, D. Ippolito, and Y. W. Yu, “Contact tracing mobile apps for
covid-19: Privacy considerations and related trade-offs.”
[29] J. Chan, D. Foster, S. Gollakota, E. Horvitz, J. Jaeger, S. Kakade,
T. Kohno, J. Langford, J. Larson, P. Sharma, S. Singanamalla, J. Sun-
shine, and S. Tessaro, “Pact: Privacy sensitive protocols and mechanisms
for mobile contact tracing.”
[30] A. Hekmati, G. Ramachandran, and B. Krishnamachari, “Contain:
Privacy-oriented contact tracing protocols for epidemics.”
[31] J. Bell, D. Butler, C. Hicks, and J. Crowcroft, “Tracesecure: Towards
privacy preserving contact tracing.”
[32] NHS. Nhs covid-19 app. NHS. [Online]. Available: https://www.nhsx.
nhs.uk/covid-19-response/nhs-covid-19-app/
[33] J. Li and X. Guo, “Covid-19 contact-tracing apps: A survey on the global
deployment and challenges.”
[34] W. Beskorovajnov, F. Do¨rre, G. Hartung, A. Koch, J. Mu¨ller-Quade,
and T. Strufe, “Contra corona: Contact tracing against the coronavirus
by bridging the centralized–decentralized divide for stronger privacy,”
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2020/505, Tech. Rep., 2020.
[35] D. Drescher, Blockchain basics. Springer, 2017, vol. 276.
[36] “Covid-19 updated impact assessment,” IATA Economics, 2020.
[Online]. Available: https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/
economic-reports/third-impact-assessment/
[37] (2020, May) Greece reveals health protocols for flights and
hotels in summer 2020. Keep Talking Greece newsblog.
[Online]. Available: https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2020/05/09/
greece-health-protocols-flights-hotels-tourism-2020/
[38] X. Li, M. Geng, Y. Peng, L. Meng, and S. Lu, “Molecular immune
pathogenesis and diagnosis of covid-19,” Journal of Pharmaceutical
Analysis, 2020.
[39] P. Network, “Proof of authority: consensus model with identity at stake,”
2017.
[40] A. Kiayias, A. Kuldmaa, H. Lipmaa, J. Siim, and T. Zacharias, “On
the security properties of e-voting bulletin boards,” in Lecture Notes in
Computer Science. Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 505–
523.
